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Abstract
In the last decade, Latin American countries experienced a large increase in their social security coverage rates. Reinforcing this 
regional dynamics, Argentina introduced in 2014 a new set of social rights through the youth oriented program named PROG.R.ES.
AR, aimed to: 1) reduce income inequality, by providing financial support to low-income young people; 2) complement and improve 
capacity-building strategies of human capital policies; and 3) stimulate aggregate demand, with the injection of up to AR$ 10,600 
million annually in terms of social investment. In order to make the first prospective evaluation of this program, the main contribution 
of this paper is to show their expected "first round" distributional impact, using data from the EPH-INDEC (Q2-2013) and applying 
the methodology popularized by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006). Our simulations show that it could potentially reduce inequality 
in up to 14.3% and 32% for the whole population and the youth, respectively.
 
Resumen
En la última década, las economías latinoamericanas experimentaron un considerable aumento en la cobertura de sus sistemas de seguri-
dad social. Reforzando tal dinámica regional, Argentina introduce en 2014 una nueva política creadora de derechos sociales orientada a 
los jóvenes, PROG.R.ES.AR, que tiene por objetivos: 1) reducir las inequidades distributivas, a partir del apoyo financiero a jóvenes de 
bajos ingresos; 2) promover la generación de nuevas capacidades en los jóvenes; e 3) impulsar la demanda agregada, inyectando hasta 
AR$10,600 millones anuales en inversión social. A efectos de realizar una evaluación de impacto del programa, la principal contribución 
de este trabajo consiste en exponer sus efectos distributivos esperados de “primera vuelta” utilizando datos de la EPH de INDEC (2T-
2013) y aplicando la metodología popularizada por Bourguignon y Spadaro (2006). Las simulaciones evidencian que PROG.R.ES.AR 
potencialmente reducirá la desigualdad hasta un 14.3% y un 32% para el total poblacional y los jóvenes, respectivamente.
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I. Introduction
Despite significant improvements of Argentinean 
labor market figures in recent years, and in spite 
of having experienced a reduction of about 40% 
and 30%, respectively, both the unemployment 
rate and the unregistered employment rate among 
young people still present remarkable high values. 
As a consequence, the youth unemployment rate 
(18-24 years old) was, on average (between 2003 
and 2013), 2.4 times the adult unemployment rate.
Moreover, the 2003-2009 auspicious initial evo-
lution appears to be stagnated in the last four years 
(see Figures 1 and 2).
Absolute and relative vulnerability of young 
people -associated to lower employability and 
wage levels- and the above mentioned recently 
stagnated dynamics make young people a key 
population sub-group for targeted public policy 
in Argentina. 
In this context, the government created in 2014 
the Programa de Respaldo a Estudiantes Argentinos 
(PROG.R.ES.AR), aimed at widening the new 
mixed (and more Beveridgean) social security 
paradigm, extending coverage to young adults 
with the following objectives:
 
m To promote new social rights and reduce income 
inequality, by providing financial support to 
low-income young people;
m	 To complement and improve capacity-building 
strategies of human capital policies; and
Figure 1
YOUTH  UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (18-24 YEARS 
OLD),  IN % OF THE ECONOMICALLY 
ACTIVE POPULATION AGED BETWEEN 
18 AND 24 YEARS OLD
Figure 2
UNREGISTERED YOUTH EMPLOYMENT RATE 
(18 TO 24 YEARS OLD), IN% OF TOTAL WAGE 
EARNERS EMPLOYED IN THE SAME
AGE GROUP
Source: Own estimations based on EPH-INDEC. Source: Own estimations based on EPH-INDEC.
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m	 To stimulate aggregate demand, with the injec-
tion of up to $ 10,600 million annually in terms 
of social investment (targeted to people that 
generate the highest Keynesian multipliers).
The main contribution of this paper is to gener-
ate the first prospective study of the PROG.R.ES.
AR "first round" distributional impact (see sec-
tion 3-Methodology), following a detailed process 
of micro simulation using public data from the 
National Permanent Household Survey (EPH-IN-
DEC). For that purpose, the paper is structured as 
follows. After this introduction, section II presents 
an overview about the PROG.R.ES.AR genesis and 
its main characteristics. Subsequently, in section 
III, the methodology used in the micro simulation 
process is described. Finally, in sections IV and V, 
we examine empirical analysis results and discuss 
our last key remarks, concluding the article with 
bibliographical references.
II. PROG.R.ES.AR in Argentina: moti-
vation and main features
Young people's difficulties to gain (good quality) 
access to the labor market constitute a structural 
and global phenomenon. In quantitative terms, 
worldwide statistics suggest that youth unemploy-
ment is much higher than that of adults. Indeed, 
the youth1 unemployment rate is nearly three times 
as high as adult rate (Figure 3), and young people 
also face much lower chances of getting a formal 
employment (OIT, 2013).
1  The definition of youth as the population group ranges from 18 to 24 years old corresponds to the category established by the 
World Bank.
In the mid 90s, and because of the high relative 
vulnerability of young people, many Latin Ameri-
can countries implemented different measures to 
improve their social, educational and employment 
status (Bourguignon et al., 2003; Villatoro, 2005; 
Rawlings, 2005; Valencia Lomelí, 2008). They built-
Figure 3
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE FOR YOUNG PEOPLE 
(AMONG 15 TO 24 YEARS OLD, IN % OF THE 
ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION 
AMONG 15 TO 24) AND TOTAL POPULATION 
(IN % OF THE WHOLE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE 
POPULATION). INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
(2001-2005, 2006-2009, 2010-2012 AVERAGES)
Source: World Development Indicators - World Bank.
Argentina
World
European Union
Latin America and Caribbean
OECD Members
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Young
people
Young
people
Young
people
Total
Population
Total
Population
Total
Population
2001-2005 2006-2009 2010-2012
COYUNTURA ECONÓMICA: INVESTIGACIÓN ECONÓMICA Y SOCIAL
Volumen XLIV | No. 2 |Diciembre de 2014 | pp. 105-126
108 
up a new generation of "conditional cash transfer 
programs", aimed to produce synergies between 
different individual capabilities (e.g. education, 
training and professional experience). This set of 
experiences includes representative programs such 
as: Programa Jóvenes con Oportunidades, Mexico; 
Programa Nacional de Inclusión de Jóvenes PRO 
JOVEN, Brazil; Programa Avancemos, Costa Rica; 
among many others.
In Argentina, youth-oriented capability-build-
ing and redistributional measures revived after the 
2001-2002 crisis. The national government imple-
mented several youth programs aimed at promot-
ing school retention (e.g. Jóvenes con Más y Mejor 
Trabajo, Programa Nacional de Becas del Bicentenario, 
Programa Nacional de Becas Universitarias, Plan de 
Finalización de estudios primarios y secundarios), as 
well as massive direct employment programs such 
as Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (PJyJHD) 
or Argentina Trabaja, where young people had a 
major participation rate (Neffa and Brown, 2011).
In this context, PROG.R.ES.AR was created by 
the Decree 84/2014. It is a direct cash transfer pro-
gram with educational and health responsibility, 
in line with the design of income policies in Latin 
America (Skoufias et al., 2001; Soares et al., 2006). It 
was designed to ensure the recognition and estab-
lishment of a new social right for young people: to 
receive state support in order to achieve reintegra-
tion and/or continuity in the educational system, 
and conducting training experiences and/or quali-
fying practices at work. In this regard, PROG.R.ES.
AR improves and refines the Argentinean new so-
cial security (increasingly Bervedigean) paradigm, 
by extending vulnerable population coverage and 
complementing other social rights creating policies 
such as: Plan Nacional de Inclusión Previsional (Decree 
1454/2005), Asignación Universal por Hijo para Protec-
ción Social (AUH)2 (Decree 1602/2009), Asignación 
Universal por Embarazo para Protección Social (AUE) 
(Decree 446/2011), and Programa Concectar Igualdad 
(Decree 459/2010), among others.
Its main and clearest antecedent is the Programa 
Jóvenes con Más y Mejor Trabajo (JMMT) (Resolution 
497/2008) which operates under the aegis of the 
Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security 
of the Nation. However, PROG.R.ES.AR overcomes 
JMMT limitations, as its integral design eliminates 
previous programs hard access restrictions (e.g. oc-
cupational status) and addresses youth issues from 
the joint action of various state agencies, which inte-
grate two inter-ministerial committees, the Executive 
Committee and Advisory Committee. The generation of 
new capabilities in young people (school retention 
and/or professional formal system) is encouraged 
2  For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection, see Agis, E., Cañete, C. & 
Panigo, D. (2013). "El impacto de la asignación universal por hijo en la Argentina", Serie Empleo, desempleo y políticas de empleo, 
15, 1-75. 
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in conjunction with: a) the promotion of vocational 
training, counseling and job placement; b) support 
on child care services -if needed-; and c) the creation 
of a network of tutors to increase adherence.
Right holders must comply with the following 
requirements: a) aged between 18 and 24 years old; 
b) with own monthly income below the minimum 
wage (SMVM) -regardless of occupational cat-
egory-; c) belonging to family groups with monthly 
incomes below SMVM (excluding the rights holder 
own income); d) being Argentine native, natural-
ized, or being resident in the country for 5 years 
at least; and e) not being beneficiary of any social 
contribution.
With regard to responsibilities, youth must 
submit: a) the national identity card; b) a certifi-
cate of ongoing education, accredited four times 
(every year) by public educational institution 
or training centers: at the enrollment date, and 
later at March, July and November; c) an annual 
certificate of health controls; and d) an affidavit, 
which certifies compliance with the requirements 
laid down. Additionally, rights holder must: e) 
fulfill specific (depending on the education level) 
academic performance requirements; and f) ac-
complish with an annual evaluation instance to be 
held in December by the National Social Security 
Administration (ANSES).
The monetary component of the program is 
a monthly cash benefit of AR$600 (USD84.55 at 
January 2014). However, replicating the design of 
the Asignación Universal por Hijo para Protección 
Social (AUH), the effective monthly stipend to re-
ceive corresponds to 80% of the prescribed amount 
(i.e. AR$480, equivalent to USD67.64) which will be 
paid through the ANSES standard payment system, 
while the remaining 20% is subject to the above 
mentioned annual evaluation. Since the payment is 
made through debit cards, the program also involves 
the incorporation of young people into the banking 
system -mechanism which (in conjunction with a 
clear defined set of requirements) strongly improves 
transparency and reduces political clientelism-. 
Funding will come from funds from the National 
Treasury annually allocated through the Budget Act.
In the following section, we show how to in-
corporate these main PROG.R.ES.AR features into 
consideration for micro simulation purposes about 
distributional issues.
III. Methodological issues and sources 
of information
In order to simulate the distributional impact of 
PROG.R.ES.AR in Argentina, we used INDEC-EPH 
(Permanent Household Survey) microdata from 
the last available database (Q2-2013)3.
3  Given that the first benefit payment was made in March 2014, the study aims to measure the impact on income distribution 
that the program would have had if it had been implemented during the second quarter of 2013.
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Microsimulation techniques implemented, fol-
lowing the methodology proposed by Bourguignon 
and Spadaro (2006), have enabled a static evaluation 
of income distribution effects of the program. Con-
sequently, obtained results should be interpreted as 
"first round" impacts that, a posteriori, will be influ-
enced by: a) macroeconomic dynamics that deter-
mine the distributional "second and further rounds" 
effects (e.g. how young people spend additional 
income and how it influences the functional income 
distribution); and b) concomitant economic policies 
and macroeconomic shocks from different sources.
Finally, and before proceeding with the descrip-
tion of the micro simulation process, it appears 
necessary to explain some caveats that may influ-
ence the accuracy of the estimates:
m The register design and microdata structure 
of the EPH4 does not allow to obtain informa-
tion regarding potential right holders living 
in separate homes to their parents/guardians. 
Therefore, compliance with household income 
requirements cannot be determined in cases in 
which potential right holders are not living with 
their parents/guardians.
m		The micro simulation operations have been 
made assuming that there exist some income 
sources that cannot be officially verified -primar-
ily those associated with unregistered activities-. 
Nevertheless, in practice, the utilization of in-
come administrative records by the ANSES -that 
differ from those provided by the survey- would 
allow the agency to find incomes that we have 
considered as not verifiable for the present work.
m		The EPH would present income under-report-
ing. Therefore, a proportion of subjects identi-
fied as right holders, actually may not be in 
compliance with both own and family income 
requirements -as their actual incomes are indeed 
higher than those reported to the survey-.
Having made the foregoing clarifications, 
methodology steps used to determine the universe 
of potential right holders are described below. 
Subsequently, that universe will allow to assess 
the expected impact of PROG.R.ES.AR on income 
distribution through micro simulations.
The initial step was to process the EPH indi-
vidual database, in order to:
 
m		Create a household identifier to allow the match-
ing with the household database.
m		Define non-monetary variables that permit the 
identification of those people who preliminarily 
qualify to PROG.R.ES.AR. To do this,
4  See http://www.indec.mecon.ar/nuevaweb/cuadros/4/EPH_disenoreg_09.pdf.
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 p		A dummy variable for young people be-
tween 18 and 24 years old was created; and
 p		According to normative requirements, re-
strictions on nationality and residence of 
young people were imposed.
m		Create a verifiable income variable (EPH vari-
able), built from the "amount of total individual 
income earned in the month of reference", from 
which the following concepts were deducted:
p	 General not verifiable income5; and
p		 Individual not verifiable income for: i) 
unregistered employees; and ii) patron or 
self-employed (cuentapropistas)6.
 
m	 Generate the adult equivalent variable, that will 
allow to build an additional variable of interest 
to be used in the calculations of the distributive 
analysis: family income per adult equivalent.
m		Create additional dummies in order to identify 
sub-universes of: a) employees, b) women, and 
c) people under the age of 18 years old.
m		Complete the initial phase by generating the 
qualifies individually variable. The dummy has 
value 1 if the young has met the individual 
requirements for being a right holder and zero 
otherwise (see Figure 4).
Then, considering previous changes made over 
the individual database:
m	 A new aggregate database was created, with the 
per household sum or average of the following 
variables: a) adult equivalent; b) less than 18 
years old; and c) employed household members.
m		Also, seven per household aggregate databases 
were constructed. They provide information 
about: household head, spouses, child/step-
child, daughters/sons in law, mothers/fathers, 
other relatives and non-relatives, respectively.
The following stage involved processing the 
complementary household database correspond-
ing to the same wave of the individual database 
previously used:
5  In this classification it is assumed that, with the exception of registered worker'wages, retirement pensions and social plans, 
benefits of legally constituted societies and interests from financial investments, the remaining income sources are not liable to 
be effectively controlled by the public sector. In addition, in the absence of EPH information in this regard, it is also assumed that 
the secondary occupation income is not verifiable (e.g. hypothesis of an unregistered secondary employment). Finally, although 
they are verifiable in nature, the following items were not included in this category: a) extraordinary incomes as unemployment 
insurance compensation (even though this component is not specifically excluded from the calculation in the current legislation); 
and b) periodic income in concept of complementary annual salary (formally excluded in the Res. 51/2014, Art. 1 - ANSES).
6  According to INDEC, cuentapropistas can be defined as people who work for its own business or activity and do not employ 
workers or only employ them seasonally.
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Figure 4
FLOWCHART, NORMATIVE PROCESS FOR DETERMINING RIGHT HOLDERS
OF PROG.R.ES.AR
*  If it is lower than $600 (monthly cash transfer per right holder of PROG.R.ES.AR), the individual will choose to stop receiving 
the alternative plan, otherwise he/she will not apply for the program.
**  Verifiable income will vary depending on the individual’s occupational category.
***  Analysis of family income excludes the right holder, according to Disc. 84/14, Art 8.
Are you between 18 and 24 years old?
DO NOT QUALIFYQUALIFY
Not
Not
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Not
Not
Not
Are you Argentinean or have you resided
in the country for at least five years?
Are you receiving any social plan whose
cash transfer exceeds $600?*
¿Have you verifiable income ** above
minimum wage (SMVM)?
INDIVIDUAL QUALIFIED
Has your family group *** verifiable 
income above minimum wage (SMVM)?
Yes
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m		A household identifier was created for matching 
purposes.
m	 Then, aggregate databases created in points 7. 
and 8. were incorporated into the household 
database.
Once the changes to the household database were 
made and saved, the process required a return to 
the modified individual database (saved after item 
6). Later, subsequente changes were implemented:
m		Matching the modified individual and house-
hold databases (saved at point 10.). Implying 
that for each household member the same ag-
gregate household information is replicated.
m		Generation of the verifiable income of the fam-
ily group7 (IVGF) variable, and a dummy that 
evaluates compliance with the family group 
income restriction, taking value 1 if it complies 
with (i.e. is lower than a SMVM) and zero other-
wise. Then, a new dummy was created in order 
to identify young people who fulfill individual 
and family requirements, and therefore qualify 
to the PROG.R.ES.AR.
m		 Subsequently, the variable that assigns the mon-
etary component of the program to those who 
qualify was generated. Two different scenarios 
were distinguished in an attempt to assign: (a) 
zero if the young was receiving an alternative al-
lowance greater than $600; and (b) the difference 
between $600 and the amount perceived, if the 
alternative program benefit was lower than $600.
m		Thereafter, the matched/enlarged individual 
database was saved and an additional ag-
gregate database per household was created, 
containing the amounts per household of the 
variables of points 12. and 13.
m		This aggregate database was then incorporated 
into the modified individual database saved in 
the previous point.
m		Next, income per adult equivalent (IAD_EQ) vari-
able was created. Defined as the ratio between 
the total family income and the number of 
equivalent adult per household.
m		Total family income 2 (ITF2) variable was built. Cre-
ated as the sum of total family income (ITF) and 
the amount of program benefits per household.
m		A posteriori, per capita family income 2 (IPCF2) 
variable was constructed from the ratio between 
ITF2 and the number of household members.
7  It must be remembered that the verifiable income of the family group will vary depending on the family relationship and the 
characteristics of coexistence of the potential right holder (considering in all cases only the income of individuals older than 
17 years old).
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m		 Income per adult equivalent 2 (IAD_EQ2) variable 
was also created, specified as the ratio between ITF2 
and the number of household equivalent adults.
m	 Then, outliers were discarded by deleting the 
5% extreme values of the per capita family income.
m		An identification of household income quintiles 
and deciles was performed, using (IAD_EQ), 
both at national and regional level.
m		Finally, all changes made to the individual 
database were saved.
Using this matched/enlarged individual da-
tabase, the expected impact of PROG.R.ES.AR on 
inequality can be performed by means of different 
indicators depending on:
 
m		 the observed income measure (Feres and 
Mancero, 2001), taking in all cases ex-ante and 
ex-post values of:
m	 total household income (ITF);
m	 per capita family income (IPCF);
m	 income per adult equivalent (IAD_EQ); and
m		 selected inequality measures (Sen and Foster, 
1997; and Haughton and Khandker, 2009), 
whose sensitivity to income transfers varies ac-
cording to the particular part of the distribution 
to be considered:
m	 Atkinson Index;
m	 Entropy measures;
m	 Gini Coefficient;
m	 Decile (D10/D1, D6/D1) and quintile (Q5/
Q1) ratios.
IV. Empirical Results
As a result of the micro simulation process, the 
universe of potential right holders was determined. 
It covers 1.55 million of young people that fulfill all 
program requirements. On this particular universe, 
47% are women. 
Firstly, we examine potential right holder perfor-
mance in the labor market. For male potential right 
holders the predominant occupational category 
is unregistered employed (49.9%) whereas most 
women who qualify do not belong to the economi-
cally active population (60%).
Figure 5
DISTRIBUTION OF POTENTIAL RIGHT  HOLDERS 
PROG.R.ES.AR ACCORDING TO OCCUPATIONAL 
CATEGORY, BY SEX.  TOTAL COUNTRY
Source: Own estimates based on EPH-INDEC (Q2-2013).
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In second instance, we intended to examine the 
distribution of potential right holders educational 
condition: a) a 42.9% was attending an educational 
institution; and b) - from a gender comparison- 
our universe of women showed a slightly higher 
educational attendance rate (45.5% female and 
40.6% male).
Afterwards, the joint analysis of youth oc-
cupational status and educational condition was 
performed (see Figure 6). Obtained results indicate 
that a 61% of potential right holders was in fact 
studying, working or performing both activities 
synchronously. 
Indeed, of all individuals aged between 18 and 
24 years old that were identified as potential right 
holders, the major sub-group was involved in the 
formal education system and looking for a job 
(31.4%), a 29.3% was exclusively looking for a job, 
and 17.6% were studying and working at the same 
time. This situation tends to refute, somehow, the ex-
tended argument that associates youth with lack of 
commitment to labor and/or educational activities, 
through the stigmatizing category of NEET8 (neither 
in employment, nor in education or training).
Then, in order to analyze the universe composi-
tion according to socioeconomic variables, it was 
considered a percentage distribution of income 
by deciles (using household income per adult 
equivalent as income measure instead of individual 
income, so that all deciles have the same amount 
of people but not necessarily the same amount of 
young people).
Figure 7 exhibits a high absolute and relative 
concentration of potential right holders in the 
lower income tail, while the distribution of the total 
population between 18 and 24 years old revealed a 
greater proportion of individuals belonging to some 
8  The English acronym 'NEET', from which the Spanish term "Ni-Ni" derives, emerged in the UK in the late eighties to reflect a 
new way of categorizing young people as a result of certain changes in policy benefits unemployment (Eurofound, 2011). For 
further analysis, see Saravi (2001).
Figure 6
DISTRIBUTION OF POTENTIAL RIGHT HOLDERS 
OF PROG.R.ES.AR ACCORDING TO OCCUPATIO-
NAL STATUS AND EDUCATIONAL CONDITION 
(AS % OF TOTAL UNIVERSE OF POTENTIAL
RIGHT HOLDERS). TOTAL COUNTRY
Source: Own estimates based on EPH-INDEC (Q2-2013).
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middle deciles (deciles 3 and 4). In fact, the group of 
the poorest 40% -at total country level- concentrated 
near the 70% of those who qualify for the program.
that -according to our estimates- the implementa-
tion of this conditional cash transfer program in 
Argentina should involve considerable positive 
effects.
In fact, we found that inequality would signifi-
cantly fall among both total population and, pri-
marily, the youth, regardless of the used indicator 
and the selected income variable (see Figure 9). In 
quantitative terms, considering the results for the 
country as a whole and for each of the geographic 
regions concomitantly, it could be expected a "first 
round" reduction of inequality that could reach 
up to 23.5% for total population and 37.7% for the 
sub-universe of young people.
Figure 7
DISTRIBUTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE (RIGHT 
HOLDERS OF PROG.R.ES.AR AND TOTAL), BY 
INCOME DECILE -CONSTRUCTED FROM INCOME 
PER ADULT EQUIVALENT. TOTAL COUNTRY
Source: Own estimates based on EPH-INDEC (Q2-2013).
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9  Refer to section III. Methodological issues and sources of information.
Finally, from a geographical perspective, it was 
found that regions with the lowest average income 
per capita of the country present the highest over-
representation ratios (defining over-representation 
as potential right holders in proportion of total 
young people between 18 and 24 years old living 
in each region): Northeast (62.3%) and Northwest 
(60.2%).
With regard to "first round"9 impacts of 
PROG.R.ES.AR on income distribution, it is noted 
Figure 8
POTENTIAL RIGHT HOLDERS OF PROG.R.ES.AR 
AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL YOUNG 
PEOPLE, BY REGION
Source: Own estimates based on EPH-INDEC (Q2-2013).
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Thus, the distribution of results by geographic 
region is presented for both population universes 
considered. In particular, for total population, Fig-
ure 10 exposes that a considerable proportion of 
results -regardless the region deemed- concentrates 
around -5% and -10%. However, while Patagonia, 
Pampeana and GBA regions appear to be associ-
ated to moderate potential falls in inequities as a 
response of the implementation of PROG.R.ES.AR, 
the distribution of results for NEA, NOA and Cuyo 
reveals prospective impact on income distribution 
notable deeper, with maximum expected decreases 
of 23.55%, 18.53% and 13.57% in turn. 
In the case of estimates for young people, firstly 
it can be seen that the range of expected decline in 
inequality vary around 20%. Given that this special 
sub-universe is the one the program is oriented to, 
it is reasonable that the impact of PROG.R.ES.AR 
shows a higher result. 
In terms of geographic analysis, as in the case of 
adults, NEA, NOA and Cuyo emerge as the areas 
that could be most affected by the program. In 
fact, its implementation could potentially reduce 
inequality in up to 37.7%, 37% and 31%, respec-
tively. Furthermore, the corresponding distribution 
to Northwest appears to reflect the most notable 
impacts, as it is located on the right side of the 
distributions of outcomes linked to the remaining 
regions of the country.
Additionally, and consistent with existing litera-
ture on distributional issues, we corroborated that 
Figure 9
PROG.R.ES.AR AGGREGATED RESULTS (TOTAL 
COUNTRY AND REGIONS). EPANECHNIKOV 
KERNEL DENSITIES FOR EXPECTED REDUC-
TION OF INEQUALITY, (BWIDTH= 0.02)
Source: Own estimates based on EPH-INDEC (Q2-2013).
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Figure 10
PROG.R.ES.AR AGGREGATED RESULTS. EPA-
NECHNIKOV KERNEL DENSITIES FOR EXPEC-
TED REDUCTION OF INEQUALITY, BY REGION 
(BWIDTH= 0.02). TOTAL POPULATION
Source: Own estimates based on EPH-INDEC (Q2-2013).
GBA
NEA
Pampeana
NOA
Cuyo
Patagonia
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0 1 2
Expected reduction of inequality
3 4
COYUNTURA ECONÓMICA: INVESTIGACIÓN ECONÓMICA Y SOCIAL
Volumen XLIV | No. 2 |Diciembre de 2014 | pp. 105-126
118 
the expected decrease in income inequality turned 
to be more significant for indicators that most heav-
ily weight -in relative terms- income changes at the 
bottom of the distribution (e.g. D10/D1; Atkinson 
with e = 2; Entropy Indicators with q = -1).
The smaller expected falls in inequalities were 
associated with the utilization of the Gini Coef-
ficient, while the most significant one was linked 
to the ratio between the average incomes of the 
richest 10% and the poorest 10% of the population 
(Figure 12 and Table 1). This arising heterogeneity 
generated a greater outcome dispersion for young 
people, sub-universe for which the range of results 
exceeds the 24 p.p. (against the range of 12 p. p. 
obtained for total population).
Figure 11
PROG.R.ES.AR AGGREGATED RESULTS. EPA-
NECHNIKOV KERNEL DENSITIES FOR EXPEC-
TED REDUCTION OF INEQUALITY, BY REGION 
(BWIDTH= 0.02). YOUNG PEOPLE
(18 TO 24 YEARS OLD)
Figure 12
EXPECTED REDUCTION OF INEQUALITY AS 
A RESULT OF PROG.R.ES.AR, BY INEQUALITY 
INDICATOR. TOTAL POPULATION AND YOUNG 
PEOPLE (18 TO 24 YEARS OLD). TOTAL
COUNTRY (Q2-2013)
Source: Own estimates based on EPH-INDEC (Q2-2013).
Note: For Atkinson Index and Entropy Indicators, we conside-
red total average of results obtained from the multiple values 
assigned to the inequality aversion parameters, -Atkinson Index 
with (ε = 0,5; 1; 1,5; 2) and Entropy Indicators with (θ=-1; 0; 1; 2)-.
Source: Own estimates based on EPH-INDEC (Q2-2013). 
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Gini Atkinson Entropía Ratios
From a geographical approach, as expected from 
the overrepresentation ratios (see Figure 8) and 
kernel analysis (Figures 9, 10 and 11), we inferred 
that although the implementation of PROG.R.ES.
AR could significantly reduce income inequality in 
all regions, the program most substantial effects will 
be associated to the poorest regions of the country: 
the Northeast (NEA) and the Northwest (NOA) (see 
Tables 2 and 3 below).
Taking into account the total population, in re-
gard to the Gini Coefficient, it is observed that while 
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Table 1
PROG.R.ES.AR. EXPECTED REDUCTION OF INEQUALITY, BY INEQUALITY INDICATOR. 
TOTAL POPULATION AND YOUNG PEOPLE. TOTAL COUNTRY (Q2-2013)
 Variation     
 
 Total Population Young People
  
INDICATOR   ITF IPCF IAD_EQ ITF IPCF IAD_EQ
 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
       
Gini -2.18 -2.42 -2.48 -7.60 -7.68 -8.10
Atkinson eps = 0.5 -4.98 -5.40 -5.57 -17.84 -17.34 -18.31
Atkinson eps = 1 -4.53 -5.28 -5.53 -16.92 -16.16 -17.17
Atkinson eps = 1.5 -4.67 -5.48 -5.81 -18.85 -17.53 -18.73
Atkinson eps = 2 -4.47 -5.13 -5.53 -20.85 -19.00 -20.42
Entropy theta = -1 -7.40 -9.31 -9.91 -31.45 -28.90 -30.16
Entropy theta = 0 -5.04 -6.04 -6.32 -18.64 -17.95 -18.94
Entropy theta = 1 -4.11 -4.50 -4.60 -13.92 -13.96 -14.71
Entropy theta = 2 -4.39 -4.38 -4.40 -14.04 -14.35 -15.00
Ratio D10/D1 -13.69 -14.30 -13.81 -27.96 -32.08 -31.59
Ratio D6/D1 -12.60 -13.29 -12.82 -25.55 -29.54 -29.00
Ratio Q5/Q1 -9.40 -9.46 -9.19 -18.50 -21.25 -20.98
Note 1: ITF is the total household income, IPCF is the per capita family income and IAD_EQ is the income per adult equivalent. 
Values represent the percentage rate of change of the indicators with respect to the values of the original base. 
Note 2: For the total population, the largest expected declines in inequality when evaluating through Atkinson eps=0.5 responds 
to the fact that given that the program is targeted to low income individuals between 18 and 24 years old, when is considered 
the population as a whole and the indicator heavily weighted the bottom of the distribution, there is still a significant amount of 
people that is intensely weighted by the indicator but is not experimenting any change in their income levels, implying that the 
reduction of inequalities for the aggregate is dimmed.
Source: Own estimates based on EPH-INDEC (Q2-2013).
Nevertheless, the asymmetrical effects on 
income distribution between less and more devel-
oped regions are most noteworthy if the analysis 
is made through indicators that assign a heavy 
weight to income changes at the bottom of the 
distribution, such as D10/D1; Atkinson with e = 
2 and Entropy Indicators with q = -1. So, in terms 
the expected reduction of inequality in NOA and 
NEA reaches 4.0% (IAD_EQ) and 4.4% (IAD_EQ) 
respectively, in the remaining geographic regions, 
the prospective falls in inequalities range from a 
minimum of 1.7% (IAD_EQ, in Patagonia) to 2.9% 
(IAD_EQ, in Cuyo), denoting a lower remarkable 
impact of the program.
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of the D10/D1 ratio –for the total population uni-
verse–, the income gap between the richest and 
poorest 10% of the population in Northeast and 
Northwest regions would, in average10, potentially 
decrease a 23.3% and a 18.3%, respectively; while in 
the case of Cuyo -the third region in terms of over-
representation ratios analysis-, the expected fall in 
inequality as a consequence of the implementation 
of PROG.R.ES.AR would be 10 percentage points 
(p.p) lower (see Table 2). 
On the other hand, if the analysis focuses on 
the population sub-universe of young people 
(see Table 3), the results follow the same pattern: 
when taking into account the outcomes related 
to the Gini Coefficient, we find that the program 
would involve a decrease in inequalities of 10.8% 
in NOA (IAD_EQ) and 9.7% in NEA (IAD_EQ). In 
addition, this potential reduction of inequalities 
accounts for a 8.3% in Cuyo and a lower 5.7% in 
Patagonia.
However, if we analyze the eventual impact of 
PROG.R.ES.AR on inequality through the indicator 
that gives a strong weight to income transfers at the 
bottom of the distribution, D10/D1, it can be seen 
that -considering the average of expected falls linked 
to the three measured income variables- in NOA the 
expected reduction of inequality reaches an average 
of 37%, and an average of 31.7% in NEA. But the 
effects of the program in Cuyo are almost as signifi-
cant as those associated to the two most backward 
regions, showing a similarity to the magnitude of 
potential impact in the remaining regions (see Table 
3). This phenomenon could answer to the fact that 
youth represent the target population group. 
V. Final Considerations
It has been well and broadly documented that 
young people are one of the most vulnerable popu-
lation sub-groups worldwide. Trying to break the 
intergenerational cycle of poverty related to youth 
social exclusion, many Latin-American countries 
have implemented different sets of public policies 
aimed to widen social rights (Cecchini y Martínez, 
2011; Rofman y Oliveri, 2011).
Argentina has not been an exception, especially 
from 2005 onwards, with a number of measures 
that partially shifted the social security paradigm 
from Bismarckian to Beveridgean principles 
(Panigo, Médici and Dvoskin, 2011).
Within this general framework, the creation of 
PROG.R.ES.AR promotes the strengthening of this 
new paradigm through the following objectives:
 
m To obtain a more equitable income distribution 
by means of new social rights;
10  Considering the three income measures evaluated: the total household income, the per capita family income and the income 
per adult equivalent.
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 Total population - variation, %  
      
  GBA   NOA   NEA  
  
Indicator ITF IPCF IAD_EQ ITF IPCF IAD_EQ ITF IPCF IAD_EQ
Gini -1.7 -2.1 -2.1 -3.1 -4.0 -4.0 -4.2 -4.2 -4.4
Atkinson eps = 0.5 -4.0 -4.7 -4.8 -6.5 -7.8 -8.0 -8.4 -8.7 -9.1
Atkinson eps = 1 -3.8 -4.8 -5.0 -6.7 -8.3 -8.6 -7.4 -8.1 -8.6
Atkinson eps = 1.5 -4.0 -5.1 -5.4 -6.9 -8.5 -8.9 -6.8 -7.9 -8.4
Atkinson eps = 2 -4.1 -5.1 -5.5 -6.8 -8.6 -9.2 -5.8 -7.1 -7.8
Entropy theta = -1 -6.6 -9.1 -9.6 -10.3 -13.7 -14.5 -9.7 -12.4 -13.2
Entropy theta = 0 -4.2 -5.5 -5.7 -7.4 -9.3 -9.6 -8.3 -9.3 -9.8
Entropy theta = 1 -3.4 -4.0 -4.0 -6.2 -7.4 -7.5 -7.7 -7.8 -8.2
Entropy theta = 2 -3.6 -3.8 -3.8 -6.3 -7.1 -7.2 -8.5 -8.2 -8.4
Ratio D10/D1 -11.5 -12.2 -11.7 -18.3 -18.5 -18.2 -23.5 -23.5 -22.9
Ratio D6/D1 -10.5 -11.4 -10.9 -16.0 -16.3 -16.0 -21.1 -20.9 -20.4
Ratio Q5/Q1 -8.1 -7.9 -7.7 -14.0 -13.5 -13.1 -14.7 -15.3 -14.9
Table 2
PROG.R.ES.AR. EXPECTED REDUCTION OF INEQUALITY, BY INEQUALITY INDICATOR. 
TOTAL POPULATION AND YOUNG PEOPLE. TOTAL COUNTRY (Q2-2013)
  Cuyo   Pampeana   Patagonia  
  
Indicator ITF IPCF IAD_EQ ITF IPCF IAD_EQ ITF IPCF IAD_EQ
Gini -2.6 -2.8 -2.9 -2.1 -2.3 -2.4 -1.7 -1.6 -1.7
Atkinson eps = 0.5 -5.3 -6.0 -6.2 -5.2 -5.3 -5.6 -4.9 -4.7 -4.9
Atkinson eps = 1 -5.3 -6.3 -6.6 -4.0 -4.3 -4.7 -4.0 -3.9 -4.2
Atkinson eps = 1.5 -5.6 -6.9 -7.2 -4.0 -4.2 -4.6 -4.8 -4.6 -5.0
Atkinson eps = 2 -6.3 -7.7 -8.0 -3.3 -3.1 -3.5 -5.3 -5.0 -5.7
Entropy theta = -1 -9.3 -12.0 -12.4 -5.9 -5.9 -6.6 -9.8 -9.5 -10.7
Entropy theta = 0 -5.8 -7.1 -7.3 -4.4 -4.9 -5.3 -4.5 -4.5 -4.8
Entropy theta = 1 -5.1 -5.4 -5.5 -3.6 -3.9 -4.1 -2.8 -2.8 -2.9
Entropy theta = 2 -5.4 -5.2 -5.2 -4.0 -4.2 -4.3 -3.0 -2.9 -2.9
Ratio D10/D1 -13.6 -13.3 -13.0 -12.9 -14.1 -13.6 -13.1 -14.7 -14.5
Ratio D6/D1 -11.6 -11.0 -10.9 -12.3 -13.4 -12.9 -12.5 -14.3 -14.1
Ratio Q5/Q1 -9.5 -9.3 -9.1 -8.1 -8.8 -8.5 -6.7 -7.4 -7.3
 
Note 1: ITF is the total household income, IPCF is the per capita family income and IAD_EQ is the income per adult equivalent. Values represent the 
percentage rate of change of the indicators with respect to the values of the original base.
Note 2: For the total population, the largest expected declines in inequality when evaluating through Atkinson eps=0.5 responds to the fact that given 
that the program is targeted to low income individuals between 18 and 24 years old, when is considered the population as a whole and the indicator 
heavily weighted the bottom of the distribution, there is still a significant amount of people that is intensely weighted by the indicator but is not 
experimenting any change in their income levels, implying that the reduction of inequalities for the aggregate is dimmed. 
Source: Own estimates based on EPH-INDEC (Q2-2013).
COYUNTURA ECONÓMICA: INVESTIGACIÓN ECONÓMICA Y SOCIAL
Volumen XLIV | No. 2 |Diciembre de 2014 | pp. 105-126
122 
 Total population - variation, %  
      
  GBA   NOA   NEA  
  
Indicator ITF IPCF IAD_EQ ITF IPCF IAD_EQ ITF IPCF IAD_EQ
Gini -6.2 -6.8 -7.0 -9.5 -10.5 -10.8 -12.2 -9.3 -9.7
Atkinson eps = 0.5 -15.4 -15.7 -16.3 -20.4 -20.7 -21.5 -24.7 -20.1 -20.6
Atkinson eps = 1 -15.4 -15.6 -16.3 -22.1 -22.0 -22.8 -22.6 -17.7 -18.2
Atkinson eps = 1.5 -17.7 -17.5 -18.4 -24.1 -23.7 -24.6 -22.6 -18.1 -18.5
Atkinson eps = 2 -20.1 -19.5 -20.7 -26.3 -25.9 -27.0 -22.2 -18.2 -18.7
Entropy theta = -1 -30.0 -29.8 -30.9 -37.0 -35.4 -36.3 -32.7 -26.9 -27.1
Entropy theta = 0 -16.8 -17.3 -18.0 -24.0 -23.9 -24.6 -24.7 -19.6 -20.1
Entropy theta = 1 -12.0 -12.7 -13.1 -18.6 -19.3 -20.1 -21.3 -17.1 -17.6
Entropy theta = 2 -11.9 -12.4 -12.7 -17.5 -18.8 -19.7 -22.3 -19.6 -20.1
Ratio D10/D1 -25.5 -28.4 -27.7 -30.3 -32.4 -32.5 -35.4 -37.7 -37.2
Ratio D6/D1 -22.8 -25.8 -25.0 -26.4 -28.3 -28.5 -30.3 -31.6 -31.1
Ratio Q5/Q1 -16.2 -18.0 -17.8 -22.9 -24.6 -24.6 -23.5 -27.1 -26.7
Table 3
PROG.R.ES.AR EXPECTED REDUCTION OF INEQUALITY, BY INDICATOR AND GEOGRAPHIC
REGION. YOUNG PEOPLE (18 TO 24 YEARS OLD; Q2-2013)
  Cuyo   Pampeana   Patagonia  
  
Indicator ITF IPCF IAD_EQ ITF IPCF IAD_EQ ITF IPCF IAD_EQ
Gini -8.6 -7.7 -8.3 -8.2 -7.9 -8.8 -4.9 -5.2 -5.7
Atkinson eps = 0.5 -17.4 -17.3 -18.5 -20.0 -19.3 -21.3 -13.6 -13.5 -14.5
Atkinson eps = 1 -16.6 -16.8 -17.9 -16.5 -14.6 -16.6 -12.4 -11.5 -12.4
Atkinson eps = 1.5 -18.5 -19.0 -20.0 -18.3 -15.3 -17.5 -15.3 -12.9 -13.9
Atkinson eps = 2 -21.9 -22.3 -23.0 -20.3 -16.0 -18.5 -18.2 -14.1 -15.6
Entropy theta = -1 -30.8 -30.9 -31.0 -30.9 -23.5 -26.3 -32.1 -24.7 -26.3
Entropy theta = 0 -18.2 -18.3 -19.3 -18.2 -16.0 -18.0 -14.1 -13.2 -14.0
Entropy theta = 1 -14.9 -14.7 -15.6 -13.7 -13.2 -14.7 -8.6 -9.1 -9.8
Entropy theta = 2 -15.6 -15.5 -16.3 -14.6 -14.9 -16.2 -9.0 -9.7 -10.3
Ratio D10/D1 -24.5 -27.1 -27.1 -29.0 -33.9 -33.3 -22.6 -28.3 -28.3
Ratio D6/D1 -19.7 -20.5 -20.7 -27.4 -31.6 -31.2 -21.5 -27.1 -27.1
Ratio Q5/Q1 -17.3 -18.6 -18.4 -17.6 -21.1 -20.7 -12.9 -16.5 -16.5
Note 1: ITF is the total household income, IPCF is the per capita family income and IAD_EQ is the income per adult equivalent. 
Source: Own estimates based on EPH-INDEC (Q2-2013).
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m	 To generate new capabilities among vulnerable 
individuals; and 
m	 To expand aggregate demand through greater 
progressivity of social investment.
The main contribution of this paper has been 
to provide, to our knowledge, the first prospective 
evaluation of the PROG.R.ES.AR potential impact 
on income distribution. 
Using INDEC-EPH data for the second quarter 
of 2013 and applying a micro-simulation methodol-
ogy (inspired by Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006), 
the expected "first round"11 effects indicate that the 
PROG.R.ES.AR could: 
m		Have more than one and a half million of po-
tential right holders, universe that represents a 
51.1% of all individuals in the age range of 18 
to 24 years old.
m	 Be characterized by an adequate level of target-
ing on the most vulnerable sectors, because: a) 
the group of the poorest 40% -total country- 
concentrated near the 70% of those who qualify 
for the program; and b) regions with the greatest 
relative representation (youth who qualify as a 
proportion of total young people in each region) 
are also the most backward in terms of average 
per capita income.
m		 Inject up to $10,600 million annually to boost 
aggregate demand, conditional on the final 
degree of youth program adherence.
m		Generate, in static terms, a reduction of income 
inequality of up to 14.3% for the whole popula-
tion (total country), depending on the indicator 
and the inequality aversion parameter consid-
ered.
m		Decrease young people inequities up to a 32.1% 
(again, for total country figures and depending 
on the indicator examined).
m		Affect much more intensively income distribu-
tion in the poorest regions of the country, with 
youth inequality reductions higher than 37% 
in both, the Northeast (NEA) and the North-
west (NOA) regions of the country.
Notwithstanding, there is still a caveat to em-
phasize. The final impact of the program in terms 
of scope and progressiveness will crucially depend 
on auxiliary search mechanisms that the Argentine 
government should promote. Such mechanisms 
play a central role in ensuring that young people 
11  The overall distributive impact will also depend on: 1) the final level of youth adherence to the program; 2) macroeconomic 
dynamics that determine the distributive effects of "second and further rounds"; and 3) concomitant macroeconomic shocks.
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who meet all program requirements and have not 
been registered yet (to May 2014), were able to do 
so in the short term. Efforts in this sense would 
strongly contribute to the consolidation of an 
increasingly Beveridgean Social Security System, 
as PROG.R.ES.AR extends previous social rights 
created by the Asignación Universal por Hijo para Pro-
tección Social (Decree 1602/09) and the Asignación 
Universal por Embarazo para Protección Social (Decree 
446/11) to young-adults aged 18 and 24 years old.
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